An election is often judged by what happens on polling day, that is, the conduct of officials, the credibility of accreditation, the security of ballot materials and the transparency of result collation. Yet the foundations of electoral legitimacy are laid much earlier, in the administrative decisions that determine who qualifies to participate, whose identity is recognised and whose name appears on the register from which the election is conducted. The integrity of the voters’ register is therefore central to the legitimacy of political representation. When questions arise over the authenticity of entries in that register, the implications reach beyond the competence of electoral administrators. They touch the relationship between the Nigerian citizen and the state, and the credibility of the institutions entrusted with translating popular consent into political authority.
The recent controversy surrounding artificial intelligence-generated photographs and other questionable entries in the preliminary register of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) presents an opportunity to examine a fundamental weakness in Nigeria’s approach to electoral administration. The commission’s Director of Information and Communication Technology, Lawrence Bayode, disclosed on October 30 that some registration officers had allegedly used their official login credentials to introduce irregular records into the database. He also explained that the irregularities included photographs suspected to have been artificially generated and other entries resulting from poor registration procedures. The commission said its Automated Biometric Identification System helped identify the questionable records. These disclosures raise an institutional question that deserves closer attention: how can a public institution entrusted with safeguarding the most consequential expression of democratic participation maintain a system in which those authorised to administer its records can allegedly compromise their authenticity?
The instinct may be to approach the matter as an issue of staff misconduct, identify the officials involved and impose appropriate sanctions. Such action would be necessary where wrongdoing is established, but it would leave a more important question unanswered. Institutional safeguards exist precisely because public systems cannot depend entirely on the personal integrity of every individual entrusted with their operation. A registration officer’s access to a database should be governed by controls that restrict unauthorised activity, preserve an audit trail and make suspicious transactions detectable. Where questionable records enter a national database through the credentials of authorised personnel, the investigation must establish whether the safeguards were absent, inadequately enforced or deliberately circumvented. The distinction matters because disciplinary action against individual officers cannot repair a system whose weaknesses remain intact.
This is where the controversy exposes a familiar problem in public administration; the tendency to invest in technology without giving equal attention to the institutional discipline required to make it effective. Nigeria’s electoral management has increasingly embraced electronic registration, biometric identification and digital platforms for managing election-related information. These developments offer considerable advantages. They can reduce duplication, improve identification and make the administration of elections more efficient. Yet technology is only as dependable as the processes governing its use. A biometric identification system can detect certain inconsistencies, but its effectiveness depends on the quality of the information submitted to it, the integrity of those operating it and the willingness of the institution to investigate what it detects. A sophisticated system that identifies suspicious entries after they have entered the database is performing an important function, but the larger objective must be to prevent such entries from being admitted in the first place.
There is a difference between detecting an administrative failure and demonstrating that the institution has the capacity to prevent its recurrence. INEC must establish which controls failed, whether registration officers had access privileges beyond their operational responsibilities, how transactions were monitored and whether supervisors were alerted to unusual registration patterns. It should also examine the possibility of collusion, the adequacy of identity verification and the effectiveness of its internal audit arrangements. These questions require a forensic examination of the affected records and the systems through which they were introduced. Without such an examination, the public may be left with a list of questionable entries and assurances that they have been removed, without knowing whether the conditions that produced them have changed.
The implications become clearer when the register is considered as an instrument of citizenship. For millions of Nigerians, registration is the administrative gateway to exercising the constitutional right to vote. An inaccurate record can therefore have consequences that extend beyond a clerical inconvenience. A genuine voter whose details are missing, altered or incorrectly recorded may encounter obstacles when attempting to establish eligibility. Conversely, questionable entries, if allowed to remain, may compromise the reliability of the information used to administer an election. The two risks demand equal attention. An electoral commission must guard against the admission of ineligible records while ensuring that eligible citizens are not deprived of participation through administrative errors. The credibility of the register rests on its ability to achieve both objectives.
This responsibility also raises an uncomfortable question about where the burden of accuracy lies. INEC collects the information, operates the registration infrastructure, issues access credentials and maintains the database. Citizens, however, are expected to inspect the resulting register and report discrepancies within designated periods. Public scrutiny is a legitimate component of electoral administration, and the Display, Claims and Objections exercise serves an important purpose. The nationwide physical display conducted from October 9 to 15 provided an opportunity for registered voters to examine the preliminary records before the commission’s online publication on October 26. Nevertheless, public participation cannot become a substitute for institutional verification. Many Nigerians may have limited access to the internet, may be unable to travel to registration centres or may not know that their records require correction. The absence of a complaint cannot reasonably be treated as proof that an entry is accurate. The commission must retain primary responsibility for establishing the reliability of the information in its custody.
The protection of personal information introduces another dimension to the matter. The voters’ register contains personal data belonging to millions of Nigerians, and its integrity is inseparable from the obligation to protect that information against unauthorised access, alteration and misuse. The Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 establishes obligations concerning the accuracy and security of personal data, as well as procedures for dealing with qualifying data breaches. Where authorised personnel allegedly introduce questionable information into a database, the relevant authorities must establish whether the conduct involved unlawful processing or alteration of personal data and whether the commission fulfilled its statutory responsibilities. The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project’s November 1 call for an independent investigation by the Nigeria Data Protection Commission is therefore pertinent. An examination conducted outside INEC would provide an additional layer of scrutiny and help establish whether the incident has implications beyond electoral administration. The commission should welcome such scrutiny as part of the process of restoring confidence.
There is, furthermore, a broader institutional cost to allowing doubts about the register to persist. Electoral commissions derive their authority from law, but the acceptance of their work depends substantially on public confidence in their impartiality and administrative competence. That confidence is accumulated through consistent conduct, transparent procedures and the demonstrable capacity to correct errors. It is also vulnerable to the memory of previous electoral disputes. In a political environment where parties frequently question electoral processes and citizens already approach official assurances with considerable scepticism, even an administrative failure can acquire wider significance. INEC must understand that the public will judge its response by the evidence it provides, rather than by the strength of its declarations.
This is particularly important as preparations advance towards the 2027 general election. The commission has scheduled December 15, 2026, for certification of the final register. That deadline provides a defined period within which questionable records must be investigated, affected information verified and legitimate claims resolved. However, the pressure to meet an administrative timetable must not encourage superficial corrections. Removing suspicious photographs or deleting questionable entries may improve the appearance of the database without necessarily resolving the weaknesses in the registration process. The commission should publish the number and distribution of affected records, explain the nature of the identified irregularities, disclose the corrective measures adopted and provide an account of the disciplinary or legal proceedings arising from verified misconduct. It should also commission an independent technical audit of the registration infrastructure, particularly the management of staff credentials, transaction logs and supervisory controls.
The new leadership of INEC also has an opportunity to establish a different standard of institutional accountability. The credibility of an electoral commission cannot rest indefinitely on the reputation of its chairman or the personal assurances of its senior officials. It must be embedded in procedures that survive changes in leadership and personnel. Access to sensitive databases should be governed by clearly defined privileges, independently reviewable records and mechanisms that detect unusual activity. Registration officers should be subject to regular supervision, while allegations of misconduct should trigger investigations capable of establishing individual responsibility and identifying administrative failures. Equally, citizens must have accessible means of checking and correcting their information, with complaints receiving documented responses within reasonable periods. These are basic requirements of responsible data administration, and their importance becomes greater when the information concerned determines access to democratic participation.
We must also resist the temptation to reduce this controversy to the novelty of artificial intelligence. The technology may make it easier to manufacture convincing images, but the fundamental problem predates its emergence. Electoral databases have always required reliable identity verification, effective supervision and safeguards against deliberate falsification. Artificial intelligence has introduced another means through which false information can be produced, making existing weaknesses more consequential. The appropriate response is to strengthen the entire verification architecture, including the capacity to distinguish authentic records from fabricated ones. Focusing exclusively on AI-generated photographs risks overlooking duplicate registrations, inaccurate personal details, unauthorised alterations and other forms of data manipulation that may be less visually striking but equally damaging to the register’s reliability.
In the end, the issue before INEC is larger than the correction of a preliminary database. It concerns whether the commission can demonstrate that the administrative machinery through which Nigerians exercise their political rights is dependable, accountable and open to independent scrutiny. The public should not have to wait until an election is disputed before learning whether the register on which it was conducted contained unresolved irregularities. Nor should citizens be expected to bear the consequences of failures arising from systems they neither designed nor control.
A credible election requires more than an efficient voting process. It requires an electoral institution capable of establishing, before the contest begins, that the records upon which participation depends are accurate and protected against manipulation. INEC has an obligation to demonstrate this through verifiable action, independent oversight and a willingness to expose its procedures to scrutiny. The final register must be more than a database that has passed through an administrative cleaning exercise. It must be a reliable account of eligible citizens whose right to participate is protected. The legitimacy of the 2027 elections will depend partly on whether the commission can establish that standard before Nigerians are called upon to vote.
