State Police: Why we must listen to Fashola

As Nigeria inches closer to restructuring its internal security architecture, the long-debated concept of sub-national law enforcement is finally moving from political rhetoric to legislative reality.

Amidst the predictable wave of uncritical optimism from various state executives, a sober masterclass in pragmatic governance was recently delivered by the former Governor of Lagos State and Minister of Works and Housing, Babatunde Raji Fashola, SAN.

Historically a vocal advocate for decentralized policing, Fashola’s recent cautionary interventions regarding the implementation of state police do not signal a retreat from federalist principles. Instead, they provide a vital injection of realism into a conversation too often dominated by emotion and political desperation. His warnings serve as a checklist for success, reminding the nation that a poorly executed structural transition will only decentralize chaos rather than secure communities.

The first pillar of Fashola’s caution rests on fiscal sustainability. In an era where a vast majority of Nigeria’s 36 states struggle to meet basic payroll obligations or fund their existing civil services without federal allocations, the rush to establish brand-new police apparatuses is financially reckless.

Policing is an incredibly capital-intensive venture that demands continuous funding for modern ballistic weaponry, regular tactical training, and advanced forensic labs. It also requires robust biometric databases, digital communication infrastructure, competitive salaries, and comprehensive healthcare benefits to insulate officers from the temptation of corruption.

Fashola rightly points out that not every state can, or should, start on day one. A staggered, opt-in implementation model based on verified fiscal readiness is far more logical than a rushed, mandatory nationwide rollout. Forcing economically fragile states into the policing business will inevitably yield underfunded, ill-equipped, and underpaid state militias, posing a greater danger to local populations than the external threats they are meant to fight.

Beyond the balance sheets, Fashola raises a foundational question that strikes at the heart of institutional integrity: Who will we put in uniform?
The temptation for states will be to simply mass-absorb existing local vigilante groups, regional security outfits, and political enforcement squads into the new state police commands. This shortcut must be aggressively resisted, as converting partisan actors or untrained personnel into legally armed state agents without rigorous vetting is a recipe for institutionalized human rights abuses.

There must be standard, non-negotiable federal guidelines governing recruitment. Background checks must be exhaustive, educational minimums must be strictly enforced, and psychological evaluations must be mandatory. If the entry pipeline is compromised to satisfy political patronage, state police forces will rapidly devolve into oppressive tools used to crush local opposition and terrorize citizens.

The most pervasive fear among critics of decentralization is the potential for state governors to hijack local police forces for political vendettas. To mitigate this, Fashola insists on a robust, ironclad enabling act that explicitly defines the boundaries of sub-national police powers.

Operational control must be institutionalized rather than personalized. The appointment and removal of a State Commissioner of Police cannot be left to the whims of a sitting governor. Instead, it should be subject to independent regulatory oversight bodies akin to a state-level Police Service Commission comprising representatives from the judiciary, civil society, and professional associations.

Furthermore, clear jurisdictional boundaries must be drawn up to prevent toxic operational clashes and rivalry between federal and state forces.

The National Assembly and the constitutional amendment committees must view Fashola’s caution not as an obstacle, but as a roadmap.

Decentralized policing remains an essential step toward addressing Nigeria’s unique, localized security challenges. However, enthusiasm must be balanced with meticulous planning.

State policing should be treated as a privilege earned through administrative maturity and financial viability, not an entitlement handed out overnight. By codifying strict fiscal benchmarks, rigorous recruitment protocols, and independent legal guardrails, Nigeria can build a multi-level law enforcement framework that is highly effective, fiscally stable, and fiercely protective of human rights. To ignore these practical warnings is to guarantee the failure of the most critical security reform of our generation.