Nigeria must put victims at the heart of deradicalisation

For more than a decade, Nigeria has been locked in a bitter struggle with insecurity, but few threats have been as destructive and enduring as the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East.

What began in the early 2000s as a fringe religious movement preaching a rigid ideology and rejecting Western influence soon mutated into a violent campaign that has left deep scars on the nation’s conscience.

From 2009 onwards, Boko Haram’s reign of terror claimed thousands of lives, levelled schools, hospitals and markets, and shattered once-thriving communities. Entire towns were emptied, livelihoods destroyed, and social trust severely eroded.

Today, despite military gains, the conflict’s legacy remains evident in the sprawling camps for internally displaced persons and the fragile socio-economic conditions of states like Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.

In response to this complex challenge, the Federal Government adopted a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies. One of the most prominent non-kinetic initiatives is Operation Safe Corridor, established in 2015 to encourage repentant insurgents to lay down their arms, disengage from extremist ideology and reintegrate into society.

Within the global framework of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), the programme is designed to reduce violence, prevent recidivism and contribute to long-term stability.

There is no denying that Operation Safe Corridor represents a bold attempt to address insecurity beyond the battlefield. Government officials and some security experts have hailed it as a pragmatic step towards peace-building in a region exhausted by war. However, nearly a decade on, serious questions persist about the programme’s scope, balance and long-term effectiveness.

A central criticism—one that resonates not only in Nigeria but across global DDR debates—is the marginalisation of victims. While former fighters are rehabilitated, trained and supported for reintegration, the countless civilians who bore the brunt of the violence often feel forgotten.

These victims lost family members, homes, farms and businesses. Many live with profound psychological trauma, physical injuries and deep resentment, conditions that, if left unaddressed, can undermine any peace process.

International experience has shown that DDR programmes which prioritise ex-combatants while neglecting victims risk creating new grievances. Such approaches may inadvertently convey the impression that violence is rewarded, while suffering goes uncompensated.

This imbalance fuels public anger, weakens community acceptance of reintegrated ex-fighters and threatens the sustainability of peace efforts.

Nigeria’s situation is particularly sensitive. The Boko Haram insurgency is not a conventional conflict, nor can its resolution rely on imported templates that ignore local realities.

The social fabric of the North-East has been torn apart, and rebuilding it requires more than reintegrating those who once took up arms. It demands deliberate investment in healing communities and restoring dignity to victims.

It is therefore imperative to rethink Nigeria’s deradicalisation strategy. Operation Safe Corridor, in its current form, appears insufficiently customised to the country’s unique circumstances. A one-size-fits-all DDR model cannot address the scale of loss, trauma and displacement experienced in the region.

This newspaper firmly believes that any credible deradicalisation framework must place victims at its heart. Peace cannot be imposed solely by rehabilitating perpetrators; it must be earned by acknowledging suffering, providing justice and restoring hope to those who endured the worst of the conflict.

One practical and urgent step would be the formal expansion of Operation Safe Corridor’s mandate to include victims and their families. This could take the form of a Victims Support Fund or a dedicated Victims Support Directorate, embedded within the programme. Such a structure should focus on psychosocial support, livelihood restoration, access to education, and community reconciliation initiatives.

Beyond material assistance, there is also a moral dimension. Victims deserve recognition, empathy and a sense that the state stands firmly with them. Structured dialogue, truth-telling mechanisms and community-based reconciliation processes should complement rehabilitation efforts for former fighters. Without these, reintegration risks becoming superficial and socially explosive.

We acknowledge and commend the efforts of the Borno State Government, humanitarian organisations, faith-based groups, philanthropists and corporate bodies that have stepped in to alleviate the suffering of affected communities. Their interventions demonstrate that victim-centred recovery is both possible and impactful. However, these efforts cannot substitute for a comprehensive, nationally coordinated framework.

The scale of devastation underscores the urgency of reform. Estimates suggest that the insurgency has caused economic damage exceeding $9 billion and displaced more than two million people. These figures are not mere statistics; they represent lives disrupted, futures delayed and communities fractured.

Integrating victims into the deradicalisation and reintegration agenda would yield far-reaching benefits. It would enhance the legitimacy of Operation Safe Corridor, foster genuine reconciliation, encourage community acceptance of reintegrated individuals, and ultimately contribute to a more stable and secure North-East.

Nigeria stands at a critical juncture. As military operations continue to degrade insurgent capabilities, equal attention must be paid to healing the wounds left behind. True victory over extremism will not be measured only by surrendered fighters, but by restored communities and a renewed social contract between the state and its citizens.

Deradicalisation, if it is to succeed, must be reimagined—not as a programme for a few, but as a holistic peace project that leaves no victim behind.