Responding to the Niger Coup: Lessons in diplomacy for Nigeria and ECOWAS
On the 26th of July 2023, the world was confronted with yet another distressing piece of news: the successful military coup in Africa’s Niger, marking the fourth such incident in a span of just two years, following similar events in Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
The Nigerien presidential guard took action by removing President Mohamed Bazoum from power, closing borders, and blocking entrances to government ministries.
Subsequently, in full alignment with the coup orchestrators, the nation’s armed forces rallied behind the coup leaders, with General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, declaring himself as the head of state after seizing control.
Amidst this turmoil, an emergency meeting was convened in Abuja, Nigeria, on the 30th of July, where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) called for the “immediate release and reinstatement” of Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, who had been held by the military since the 19th of July.
In response, the regional bloc issued a one-week ultimatum to the regime, stressing their willingness to employ any necessary measures — including the use of military force — to restore constitutional order. However, the military junta disregarded these warnings and remained unresponsive to another ultimatum issued by ECOWAS on the 10th of August.
Embedded within ECOWAS’s objectives is the preservation of peace and stability in the West African region through conflict prevention, resolution, and peacekeeping initiatives. Nigeria, guided by its foreign policy principle of African Centrality, assumes leadership roles in regional bodies such as the African Union and ECOWAS, currently chaired by Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu.
While adhering to a policy of non-alignment in global power struggles, Nigeria actively engages in diplomatic efforts to address conflicts both within Africa and on the global stage. Over the years, the country has played a mediating role in various conflicts, including those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.
In analyzing potential strategies to address the Niger crisis, it becomes crucial to assess what aligns with Nigeria’s national interests and contributes to the overall security and stability of West Africa. From this vantage point, three primary considerations emerge to guide Nigeria’s response to the constitutional and leadership crisis in Niger Republic.
The border between Niger and Nigeria stretches over 1,600 kilometers, spanning the Nigerian states of Yobe, Jigawa, Kebbi, Katsina, and Sokoto, regions that have grappled with insecurity for over a decade. Notably, Niger plays an essential role as a security partner to Nigeria within initiatives like the G5 and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional military operation targeting terrorist insurgents in the Lake Chad Basin. Moreover, Niger hosts Sector 4 of the Force in the Diffa Presence. The presence of Nigerien troops in the MNJTF is pivotal to containing the insurgency and has significantly contributed to the military successes in Nigeria’s North East region. Taking these factors into account, any hostile action against the coup regime could prompt a withdrawal from the MNJTF, unraveling a critical component of the coalition against insurgents and jeopardizing counterinsurgency gains. Additionally, the Nigerien regime might allow ISWAP to use its territory as a base for regrouping and launching attacks on Nigeria, resulting in both humanitarian and military crises.
Presently, over 300,000 Nigerian refugees have sought shelter in Niger, primarily fleeing conflict and armed group activities in Nigeria’s North-East and North-West regions. Furthermore, over a million Nigerians reside in Niger, constituting 73 per cent of the refugee population. Ethnically driven concerns also factor into addressing the Niger crisis, as the ousted President Bazoum is the first Diffa Arab to lead Niger. These Arabs, residing mainly in the Diffa Region of eastern Niger, have a history of tense interactions with other groups, particularly the Fulani, marked by disputes over pastoral resources and clashes with the Nigerien government.
Niger and Northern Nigeria share a longstanding sociocultural, familial, and economic connection. Many households along the 1,600 km border boast a binational heritage due to strong ancestral links. This connection was notably highlighted in December 2022 when former President Muhammadu Buhari, former Governor Badaru Abubakar of Jigawa State, and Mohammed Matawalle of Zamfara State, alongside businessmen Aliko Dangote and Abdulsamad Rabi’u, received Niger’s national honors. Yet, a protracted conflict with Niger could potentially strain social cohesion in Northern Nigeria. A portrayal of ECOWAS intervention as a military assault by the Nigerian president against a population with shared cultural ties might ignite tensions. In the event of hostilities, the safety of Nigerian nationals and the numerous refugees would be at severe risk.
Plans for the orderly return of refugees depend on bilateral agreements with the Nigerien government, but a hostile regime could lead to expulsion, causing a catastrophic humanitarian and security crisis in both North-West and North-East Nigeria.
Nigeria’s military resources would be heavily strained by any extensive ECOWAS military intervention in Niger, as it possesses the most formidable armed forces in West Africa. Besides external peacekeeping, the Nigerian military is currently engaged in internal security operations across 32 of the federation’s 36 states, simultaneously confronting insurgencies in the North East, North-West, and South-East. Any commitment on the scale required for a viable military operation would weaken the internal security structure, making it susceptible to exploitation by hostile non-state actors. Consequently, the outcome of military intervention would leave Nigeria less secure.
Though envisaged as a swift operation to reinstate civilian leadership, the reality could manifest as a prolonged conflict featuring both conventional and irregular combat. Unlike situations in Sierra Leone and Gambia, where restoring ousted civilian governments was relatively smooth for the Nigerian military, Niger presents a distinct challenge due to its geopolitical and geoeconomic significance. Occupying a larger territory with well-tested armed forces, Niger’s role in the Lake Chad Basin’s defense and security framework amplifies the stakes.
A Nigerian-led intervention would inadvertently perpetuate stereotypes in Francophone states. This narrative could embolden the Nigerien regime to mobilize its forces and population against the intervention forces. Instead of being perceived as liberators, Nigerian troops might be viewed as an occupying force, intensifying the conflict and risking civilian casualties. Moreover, the substantial Nigerian population in Niger would be vulnerable. Anti-Nigerian sentiment could surge in Francophone nations, impacting Nigerian nationals, businesses, and investments not only in Niger but also across other Francophone African countries.
While recommending that ECOWAS adopt a diplomatic approach to resolving the Niger crisis, it is equally vital for the regional body to resist the introduction of foreign military forces. Foreign intervention could lead to an aftermath of anarchy and enduring instability. History has demonstrated that while military interventions might achieve regime change relatively easily, managing the post-change phase is far more complex.
The instances of Iraq and Libya underscore this point, with interventions causing immense human suffering and regional instability due to a lack of consideration for post-conflict stabilization. The NATO intervention in Libya, for instance, triggered instability and weapon proliferation across the African continent, birthing groups like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State affiliates, and Boko Haram that continue to wreak havoc.
The perception of Nigeria as an Anglophone giant with hegemonic intentions in the Francophone West African imagination has fueled distrust and suspicion in Nigeria’s relations with Francophone ECOWAS member states. While ECOWAS plays a vital role in resolving the Niger crisis, it must acknowledge the existing mistrust among member states. Recent years have seen the rise of military regimes in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, forming a distinct bloc within ECOWAS. These regimes, driven by anti-French sentiments and populist ideals, have resisted ECOWAS sanctions, fostering a sense of solidarity. The emergence of the new Niamey regime further bolsters the “anti-French” bloc.
An ECOWAS military intervention in Niger would likely garner support from other military-led countries, aligning them with the Niamey regime. Mali and Burkina Faso have openly declared their intent to support Niger militarily against any attack on the regime. They have rejected ECOWAS sanctions on Niger, potentially leading to a division within the West African Union.
Given these complexities, it remains in Nigeria’s best interest to ensure stability in Niger. A stable Niger serves as a buffer against the chaos emanating from Libya. Hastily pursuing military action against the new regime could destabilize Niger and the broader Sahel region, potentially reigniting the Tuareg insurgency. This instability would empower Sahel armed groups, accelerating their southward movement towards coastal West Africa. For Nigeria, a chaotic Niger could trigger refugee influxes into the already fragile regions of its southern neighbor, sparking humanitarian and security crises.
©DR ZAINAB SULEIMAN
